Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. U.S by Galvin, Charles O. & Devins, Neal
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1983
Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. U.S
Charles O. Galvin
Neal Devins
William & Mary Law School, nedevi@wm.edu
Copyright c 1983 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Galvin, Charles O. and Devins, Neal, "Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. U.S" (1983). Faculty Publications. 379.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/379
HeinOnline -- 36 Vand. L. Rev. 1353 1983
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 
VoLUME 36 NOVEMBER 1983 NUMBER 6 
A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob 
Jones University v. United States 
Charles 0. Galvin* and Neal Devins** 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 1354 
II. TAX PoLICY AND THE THREE BRANCHEs oF GoVERN-
MENT ........•......•............••......••.... 1355 
m. Bob Jones University v. United States . .......... 1356 
A. The Meaning of the Tax Exemption Provision 1359 
1. Analysis of the Public Benefit Doctrine ... 1365 
2. Analysis of the Common Community Con-
science Requirement .................... 1366 
3. Analysis of the Tax Exemption and the 
"Tax Expenditure" Budget .............. 1368 
B. The Scope of IRS Rulemaking Authority .... 1371 
c. Issues That the Court Did Not Resolve . ..... 1374 
1. Is a Tax Exemption Government Aid? ... 1374 
2. Can Some of a Tax-Exempt Organization's 
Practices Violate Public Policy? ......... 1376 
3. Does Granting Tax-Exempt Status Trigger 
Constitutional Scrutiny? ................ 1377 
IV. CoNCLUSION .................................... 1379 
• Centennial Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.S.C., Southern Methodist Uni-
versity, 1940; M.B.A., Northwestern University, 1941; J.D., 1947; S.J.D., Harvard, 1961. For-
mer member, Advisory Group on Exempt Organizations to the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue. 
•• Director, Religious Liberty and Private Education Project, Institute for Public Pol-
icy Studies, Vanderbilt University. B.A., Georgetown University, 1978; J.D., Vanderbilt Uni-
versity, 1982. Mr. Devins' research is supported by a grant from the Institute for Educa-
tional A1fairs. The views expressed are those of the authors. 
1353 
HeinOnline -- 36 Vand. L. Rev. 1354 1983
1354 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1353 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In one of last term's most notable decisions, the United States 
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States1 consid-
ered the meaning of the tax exemption provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code (the Code) and the relationships among the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), Congress, and the courts in formulating 
tax policy. Affirming an IRS ruling2 that denied tax exemptions to 
racially discriminatory private schools, the Court devised a model 
for the interaction of the three branches of government in tax pol-
icy matters. This model assigns to the IRS primary authority to 
develop rules governing the implementation of the tax exemption 
laws and assigns to the courts and Congress secondary authority to 
oversee the IRS. The decision seems to alter the earlier model in 
which the courts had retained primary authority to determine stat-
utory intent and to review IRS actions in the tax exemption area. 
Furthermore, the Court interpreted the applicable Code provisions 
under which Bob Jones University claimed tax exemption as re-
quiring that the institution confer a "public benefit" and have a 
purpose in harmony with a "common community conscience.''3 
This Article questions the tax policy model that the Court ar-
ticulated in Bob Jones University. The authors believe that the 
Court's recognition of the primacy of IRS rulemaking is undesir-
able because the IRS, as an executive agency, is susceptible to the 
influence of the incumbent administration's policy objectives. Fur-
ther, even though the life-tenured status of judges insulates the 
courts from external political pressures, significant problems are 
also present in a model in which the courts occupy a primary role 
in formulating tax policy. In sum, Congress is better suited than 
either the courts or the IRS to determine tax policy because it is 
institutionally organized to gather social and economic data, to de-
fine policy objectives, and to legislate to achieve these objectives, 
which often have repercussions beyond the circumstances of a par-
ticular case. 
This Article's criticism of Bob Jones University also extends 
to the Court's "public benefit" and "common community con-
science" standards for charitable organizations seeking to qualify 
for tax exemptions. Although restrictive standards suggest that a 
tax exemption is a form of government aid, the Court declined to 
1. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). 
2. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. 
3. 103 S. Ct. at 2028-29; see infra notes 33·56 and accompanying text. 
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make this holding explicitly:' Moreover, the majority's recognition 
of the IRS's broad rulemaking authority seems inconsistent with 
the "community conscience" standard, for in the exercise of its 
broad administrative discretion the IRS need not strictly follow 
this standard. Finally and most significantly, the "public benefit" 
and "community conscience" standards may discourage organiza-
tions that provide a healthy diversity of views in a pluralistic 
society. 
This Article begins with a general discussion in part II of the 
role of the courts in the development of federal tax policy.15 A criti-
cal analysis of the Bob Jones University decision-focusing upon 
both the specific tax exemption issue and the Court's general 
model for tax policy decisionmaking-follows in part ill.6 Part IV 
concludes the Article with a recommendation that Congress act de-
finitively to take the lead in formulating tax policy.'7 
II. TAX POLICY AND THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT 
Congress, the courts, and the executive branch-through the 
IRS and the Treasury Department-historically have all interacted 
in formulating tax policy. Congress, of course, has contributed tax 
legishition-legislation that has evolved from the Revenue Act of 
1913 to the extraordinarily complex rules of the present Internal 
Revenue Code. The Treasury Department and the IRS have added 
extensive regulations and rulings to the already unwieldy tax legis-
lation. Courts then have attempted to work their way through the 
resulting murkiness-the "dank, miasmic, myxomycetous sump.''8 
Judge Learned Hand artfully described the difficulty confronting 
the courts: 
[T]he words of such an act as the Income Tax • • . merely dance before my 
eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception 
upon exception-couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold 
of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but 
successfully concealed, purport. . . . I ·know that these monsters are the re-
sult of fabulous industry and ingenuity . . . ; one cannot help wondering 
whether to the reader they have any significance save that the words are 
4. See infra notes 96-110 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 8-15 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 16-120 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text. 
8. Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicali-
ties of Ta:c Reform and the ABA's CSTR, in B. BITTKER, C. GALVIN, R. MuSGRAVE & J. 
PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE INcoME TAX BASE? 89 (1968) (reprints articles and additional 
remarks by these authors from 80 HARv. L. REv. 925 (1967) and 81 HARv. L. REv. 44, 63, 
1016, and 1032 (1968)). 
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strung together with syntactical correctness.8 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of interpretation, the courts 
profoundly have influenced the development of tax law. As one 
commentator noted, "Congress has the first word in [tax formula-
tion] ... but the courts have the last word."10 Similarly, as two 
former Justice Department officers observed, "Frequently, a 
phrase in a ruling, a court opinion, or even an argument in a gov-
ernment tax brief can have as much impact on tax policy as a new 
federal tax statute.''11 A court's determination of tax policy gener-
ally serves to refine congressional legislation to fit contemporary 
needs. Unlike tax legislation, which "prospectively formulates rules 
with universal applicability[,] . . . tax litigation formulates rules 
retrospectively, aiming principally at resolving disputes of immedi-
ate concern. "12 
Thus, under this traditional model the courts had primary au-
thority to shape the meaning of the Code, usually after a private 
party's challenge of an IRS directive13 or procedure, 14 or the gov-
ernment's appeal of an unfavorable lower court decision. u Bob 
Jones University is significant because it alters the structure of 
decisionmaking by placing primary supervisory authority in the 
IRS. 
III. Bob Jones University v. United States 
Bob Jones University calls itself "the world's most unusual 
university."16 Although unaffiliated with any established church, 
the University is dedicated to the teaching and propagation of fun-
damentalist religious ~eliefs.17 In pursuit of these goals the Univer-
sity dictates strict rules of conduct for its students.18 To enforce 
9. Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947). 
10. R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 656 (1954 ed.). 
11. Ferguson & Henzke, The Formulation of Federal Tax Policy Through Litigation, 
1 VA. TAX REv. 85, 85 (1981). 
12. Id. at 86. 
13. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2023 (1983) (discuss-
ing Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974)); see infra text accompanying note 22. 
14. See, e.g., Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 
3109 (1983); infra note 95. 
15. See Ferguson & Henzke, supra note 11, at 91-98. 
16. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 734 (1974). 
17. Id. 
18. For example, 
The institution does not permit dancing, card playing, the use of tobacco, movie-going, 
and other such forms of indulgences in which worldly young people often engage; no 
student will release information of any kind to any local newspaper, radio station, or 
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one such rule forbidding interracial dating and marriage, the Uni-
versity denies admission to applicants engaged in or known to ad-
vocate interracial dating and marriage.19 
The Bob Jones University controversy began in November 
1970 when the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia in Green v. Kennedy20 enjoined the ms from according 
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools in Mis-
sissippi. The Green court suggested that the ffiS would not be per-
mitted to grant tax-exempt status to institutions that violate the 
government's public policy of nondiscrimination. The ffiS then re-
versed its position of granting tax exemptions to racially discrimi-
natory institutions and notified the University that it intended to 
challenge the tax-exempt status of private schools with racially dis-
criminatory admissions policies.21 In response, the University in 
1971 sought to enjoin the ms from revoking its tax-exempt status. 
television station without first checking with the University Public Relations Director; 
students are expected to refrain from singing, playing, and, as far as possible, from 
"tuning-in" on the radio or playing on the record player jazz, rock-and-roll, folk rock, 
or any other types of questionable music; and, no young man may walk a girl on canl-
pus unless both of them have a legitimate reason for going in the same direction. 
Note, The Internal Revenue Service's Treatment of Religiously Motivated Racial Discrimi-
nation by Tax Exempt Organizations, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 925, 925 (1979) {quoting Bob 
Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.S.C. 1978)). 
19. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2023 (1983). The sponsors of 
the University believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage. Id. at 2022. 
20. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 
956 (1970), appeal dismissed sub nom. Coit v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971). The IRS decision 
to deny tax-exempt status to discrinlinatory private schools was in accord with plaintiffs' 
argument in Green that to grant tax exemptions to schools that violate the important public 
policy objectives established in Brown v. Board of Educ. and the Civil Rigqts Act of 1964 
would be improper. See IRS News Release (July 10, 1970); N.Y. Times, July 11, 1970, at A1, 
col. 8. The court made permanent the Green v. Kennedy temporary injunction in Green v. 
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). Until the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Bob Jones University, the precedential effect of Green was unclear. In 
Boh Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974), the Court claimed that since the IRS was no 
longer maintaining an adversarial position against the plaintiffs in Green at the time of the 
trial, "the [Supreme] Court's affirmance in Green lacks the precedential weight of a case 
involving a truly adversary controversy." Id. at 740 n.11. 
21. Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. at 2023. Prior to 1971, Boh Jones University com-
pletely excluded blacks. From 1971 to 1975, the University accepted applications from 
blacks married within their race. Since May 1975, the University has permitted unmarried 
blacks to enroll subject to this disciplinary rule prohibiting interracial dating and marriage. 
See id. The Fourth Circuit's decision in McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), 
a{f'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), influenced the University's decision to opon its admissions to 
blacks. McCrary held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited private schools from denying admis-
sions to students on the basis of race. 515 F.2d at 1086-87. McCrary, however, did not ad-
dress whether a private school can deny admissions on the basis of race as a matter of 
religious belief. 
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That suit culminated in a 197 4 Supreme Court decision that "pro-
hibited the University from obtaining judicial review by way of in-
junctive action before the assessment or collection of any tax. "22 
The IRS in January 1976 formally revoked the University's 
tax exemption.28 Mter paying a portion of the federal unemploy-
ment taxes due, the University filed suit for a refund, contending 
that it was statutorily and constitutionally entitled to reinstate-
ment of its tax exemption.2" In April1981 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the revocation of the ex-
emption.25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bob Jones 
University and in Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United 
States,26 a case presenting identical issues. On January 8, 1982, the 
Justice Department petitioned the Court to vacate these cases as 
moot in light of the Reagan administration's decision to reinstate 
the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools.27 
Because of a related court order that prevented the administration 
22. Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. at 2023 (discussing Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 
u.s. 725 (1974)). 
23. Revenue Ruling 71-447 formally established the policy of prohibiting the granting 
of tax exemptions to private schools that maintained racially discriminatory policies. Rev. 
Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. Revenue Procedure 72-54 required private schools to publicize 
their nondiscriminatory policies, although it demanded no particular method of publication. 
Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834. The IRS in 1975 updated its stipulations for private 
schools seeking tax-exempt status. Revenue Procedure 75-50 provided guidelines and man-
dated recordkeeping to assess whether a private school's policies were racially nondiscrimi-
natory. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. The regulation mandates that tax-exempt institu-
tions: (a) adopt formally nondiscriminatory policies in their charters or bylaws, (b) refer to 
such policies in their advertising brochures, and (c) publish annual notice of such policies in 
a local newspaper of general circulation. Id. §§ 4.01-.03, 1975-2 C.B. 587-88. See Devins, Tax 
Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: A Legislative Proposal, 20 HARv. 
J. ON LEGIS. 153, 157 (1983). The IRS in 1975 also published a revenue ruling denying tax-
exempt status to any religious institution that maintained racially discriminatory policies, 
even if sincere religious belief was the basis of that discrimination. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 
C.B. 158. Current IRS policies rely on those two 1975 rulings. For a general description of 
federal governmental actions on this issue prior to the Reagan policy shift, see Devins, 
supra, at 155-61. 
24. Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. at 2023. 
25. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1981). The district court 
had concluded that the University was entitled to tax-exempt status on both statutory and 
first amendment grounds. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 897-98 
(D.S.C. 1978). 
26. 454 U.S. 892 (1981). The Court heard both cases simultaneously. 
27. Memorandum for the United States, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United 
States and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). In addition, on January 
8, 1982, the IRS announced that "without further guidance from Congress, the Internal 
Revenue Service will no longer deny tax-exempt status for . . . organizations on the grounds 
that they don't conform with certain fundamental public policies." IRS News Release (Jan. 
8, 1982). 
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from reinstating this status/8 however, the administration with-
drew its request that the Court declare the cases moot.29 The Su-
preme Court denied tax exemptions to the two petitioner schools 
on May 24, 1983.30 In its decision the Court made certain general 
pronouncements both on the meaning of the Code's tax exemption 
provision and on the ffiS's authority to issue rulings in accordance 
with its own interpretation of the Code. 31 The majority held that a 
tax-exempt institution must confer some "public benefit" and that 
its purpose must not be at odds with the "common community 
conscience."32 The Court further held that the ffiS has broad au-
thority to interpret the Internal Revenue Code and to issue rulings 
based on its interpretation. 
A. The Meaning of the Tax Exemption Provision 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Code provides that "[c]orporations 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
. or educational purposes" are entitled to tax-exempt status:33 
28. Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982). 
29. See Babcock, Administration &ks High Court to Settle School Exemption Issue, 
Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1982, at A3, col. 4; Taylor, School Tax Issue Put to High Court in 
Shift by Reagan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1982, at AI, col. 1. The government, however, did not 
change its position that the IRS lacked authority to promulgate procedures denying tax-
exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. Thus, the Court felt compelled to 
appoint "counsel adversary"-William T. Coleman, Jr.,-to argue the government's side of 
the case. Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States and Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 50 U.S.L.W. 3837 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1982). For a critique of this Court decision, see 
Devins, Is the Supreme Court on the Reagan Team?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 3, 1982, 
at 22; McCoy & Devins, Does the Bob Jones Case Meet the Case-or-Controversy Require-
ment?, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 18, col. 1. 
30. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). 
31. The Court also ruled against Bob Jones University on its clainl that the first 
amendment's free-exercise-of-religion clause blocked the IRS from implementing its racial 
nondiscrimination policy against the University. The Court held that "the Government has 
a fundamental overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education . . . . 
That governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits 
places on [the University's] exercise of [its] religious beliefs." I d. at 2035. For a discussion of 
the religious liberty issue raised in Bob Jones University, see Laycock, Tax Exemptions for 
Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 TEx. L. REv. 259 (1982); Neuberger & Cmm-
plar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack: Conflicting Goals of Religious Freedom 
and Racial Integration, 48 FoRDHAM L. REv. 229, 258-75 (1979); Note, The Judicial Role in 
Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARv. L. REv. 378, 
401-04 (1979). For a critique of the Court's ruling on the religious liberty issue, see Devins, 
Did the High Court Go Too Far to Make a Politically Popular Ruling?, NAT'L L.J., June 20, 
1983, at 13, col. 1. 
32. 103 S. Ct. at 2028-29. The Court did not reach the issue of whether an organization 
could receive tax-exempt status if it violated some public policy but also conferred some 
public benefit. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. 
33. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976); see also id. § 501(a) (providing that an organization de-
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Applying this section, the IRS had ruled that to qualify for tax 
exemption an institution must demonstrate that it falls within one 
of the categories defined in that section and that its activity is not 
contrary to settled public policy.34 The IRS felt that the settled 
public policy was that the section 501(c)(3) tax exempt organiza-
tion-even if not qualifying as a "charitable" organization-must 
be charitable in the common law sense. The common law notion of 
charity includes an effort to further a public purpose.311 The Uni-
versity contested the Service's construction of the tax exemption 
provision, arguing that the position of the IRS contradicted the 
statute's plain language and legislative history and that the IRS 
had adopted the faulty reasoning of the Green court.38 
In its "plain language" argument the University emphasized 
the absence of any statutory language that expressly required all 
scribed in § 501(c) shall be exempt from taxation unless such exemption is denied under § 
502 or § 503). The complete text of§ 501(c)(3), specifying those organizations qualifying for 
tax exemption, follows: 
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition 
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equip-
ment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earn-
ings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substan-
tial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, 
to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does 
not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of state-
ments), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. 
Subchapter F of the Internal Revenue Code, §§ 501-28, is an elaborately detailed set of 
statutory rules providing tax exemptions for varions qualifying organizations. Section 501(a) 
provides generally for exemption from tax for those organizations described in subsections 
(c) and (d). Subsection (c) lists 22 organizations that enjoy tax exemption, and subsection 
(d) describes certain religious or apostolic organizations. In particular, § 501(c)(3) describes 
certain types of organizations that not only enjoy tax-exempt status but also afford gener-
ally deductible contributions under§ 170. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
34. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. at 2025; see Brief of Amicus Curiae 
William T. Coleman, Jr. at 11-44, Bob Jones Univ. 
35. 103 S. Ct. at 2025-26. 
36. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Bob Jones Univ. For a discussion of Green, see infra 
notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc., concerned similar arguments. Goldsboro is a private 
elementary and secondary school that denied admissions to blacks, supposedly for religious 
reasons. Goldsboro challenged the denial of its tax-exempt status in much the same way 
that Bob Jones University had done. The two cases were joined before the Supreme Court. 
454 U.S. 892 (1981). Because the statutory and tax policy issues raised in Goldsboro are 
identical to those issues in Bob Jones University, the two cases can be treated as identical 
for the purposes of this Article. The two cases, however, do differ on the religious liberty 
issue. The government has a stronger interest in preventing a school from denying admis-
sions to blacks than in limiting a school's interracial social relationships. See Weeks & 
Devins, First Amendment Free Exercise Protections, 6 LEx. CoLLEGII 1 (Summer 1982). 
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exempt organizations to be "charitable" in the common law sense 
of providing some public benefit. The University maintained that 
the disjunctive "or" separating the categories in section 501(c)(3) 
precluded this reading of the statute and that any organization 
falling within the specified categories automatically qualified for an 
exemption.37 This "plain language" argument relied on decisions in 
which the Court refused to transfer the meaning of one statutory 
term to another employed in the disjunctive.38 Similarly, the Uni-
versity condemned the IRS's attempt "to make 'religious' an adjec-
tive modifying 'charitable'" as equally untenable.39 
The majority, however, rejected the "plain language" 
argument: 
It is a well-established canon of statutory construction that a court 
should go beyond tbe literal language of a statute if reliance on that language 
would defeat the plain purpose of the statute .... "[I]n interpreting a stat-
ute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general 
words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute • . . 
37. 103 S. Ct. at 2025; see also Brief for Petitioner at 10-23, Bob Jones Univ. 
38. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). Defendants in Reiter con-
tended that Clayton Act coverage of "'[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or 
property'" should extend only to "business activity or property related to one's business." 
!d. at 337-38. The Court, however, disagreed: 
That strained construction would have us ignore the disjunctive "or" and rob the 
term "property" of its independent and ordinary significance; moreover, it would con-
vert the noun "business" into an adjective. In construing a statute we are obliged to 
give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used. . • • Canons of construction ordi-
narily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless 
the context dictates otherwise; here it does not. ... Congress' use of the word "or" 
makes plain that "business" was not intended to modify "property," nor was "prop-
erty" intended to modify "business". 
!d. at 338-39 (citations omitted). 
39. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Bob Jones Univ. The University also contended that 
"where substantial constitutional issues under the Religion Clauses would arise by virtue of 
the extension to religious institutions of a governmental requirement, this Court has held 
that the extension may not be left to implication, but instead 'there must be present the 
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.'" !d. (relying upon NLRB v. Catho-
lic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979)). This contention is without merit. First, the 
Catholic Bishop decision, upon which the University based this argument, presented the 
Court with an opportunity to vindicate the Bishop's position on either statutory or constitu-
tional grounds. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(NLRB cannot order representation elections for lay teachers in Catholic high schools on 
both statutory and first amendment grounds). Bob Jones University did not present the 
Court with such a choice because the Court viewed the school's religious liberty claim as 
subsidiary to the government's interest in racial nondiscrimination. Second, the Court in 
Catholic Bishop recognized that "the amendment may not be substituted for construction 
and that a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict with 
constitutional limitation." Yu Cong Eng. v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926). In short, the 
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University did not address the Catholic Bishop issue. 
HeinOnline -- 36 Vand. L. Rev. 1362 1983
1362 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1353 
and the objects and policy of the law ... . "40 
The majority adopted the view that the common law of charitable 
trusts had guided the enactment of section 501(c)(3)41 and that 
Congress had expressly adopted the common law's public benefit 
rationale for charitable exemptions: 
"The exemption from taxation of money and property devoted to charitable 
and other purposes is based on the theory that the Government is compen-
sated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would 
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public funds, and by 
the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare."41 
In unusually sweeping language, the majority then articulated its 
standards for exemptions: 
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity con-
fers a public benefit-a benefit which the society or the community may not 
itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the 
work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues. . . • The insti-
tution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community con-
science as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be 
conferred. •s 
The University was not entitled to tax-exempt status under 
these standards because "an educational institution engaging in 
practices affirmatively at odds with [the government's] declared 
position [on racial nondiscrimination] . . . cannot be seen as exer-
cising a 'beneficial and stabilizing influence in community life.' "44 
Further, "In determining what purposes may benefit the commu-
nity and what organizations are therefore exempt, public benefit 
must be measured by present social and governmental legal and 
moral standards, rather than those in existence at the time section 
501 was enacted. "415 Under such contemporary standards46 the 
Court recognized that the " 'legitimate educational function [of a 
racially discriminatory private school] cannot be isolated from dis-
criminatory practices. . . . [D ]iscriminatory treatment exerts a 
pervasive influence on the entire educational process.' "47 The 
40. 103 S. Ct. at 2025-26 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 
(1857) (emphasis supplied by the Court). 
41. 103 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of Racially Discrimina-
tory Religious Schools, 36 TAX L. REv. 477, 485-99 (1981)). 
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938)). 
43. 103 S. Ct. at 2028-29 (emphasis supplied). 
44. ld. at 2032 (quoting Walz v. Tax Com'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)}. 
45. Simon, supra note 41, at 488; see 103 S. Ct. at 2029 n.20. 
46. Racial discrimination in education officially did not become a public wrong until 
the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
47. 103 S. Ct. at 2030 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468-69 (1973)) 
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majority thus concluded that "[i]t would be wholly incompatible 
with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant the benefit of 
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational entities."4s 
Justice Rehnquist, the sole dissenter, endorsed the Univer-
sity's argument that the legislative history militated against a find-
ing that section 501(c)(3) required common law charitability. His 
dissent traced the evolution of the tax exemption provision and 
rejected finding "some additional, undefined public policy require-
ment.""' He concluded "that the legislative history of § 501(c)(3) 
unmistakably makes clear that Congress has decided what organi-
zations are serving a public purpose and providing a public benefit 
within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) and has clearly set forth in § 
501(c)(3) the characteristics of such organizations."110 Nonetheless, 
Justice Rehnquist could not persuade the majority of the absence 
of the common law notion of charity in the section. 
Justice Powell, concurring, avoided making broad pronounce-
ments on the meaning and purpose of the tax exemption provision. 
Instead, he confined his analysis to the narrow issue of whether 
"there are now sufficient reasons for accepting the IRS's construc-
tion of the Code as proscribing tax exemptions for schools that dis-
criminate on the basis of race as a matter of policy."111 In trying to 
discern the legislative intent behind the provision, Justice Powell 
attributed great weight to the refusal of Congress to act on propos-
als that would have overturned the IRS's nondiscrimination pol-
icy112 and to the amendment of the Code that denies tax exemp-
(emphasis supplied by the Court). 
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2030. 
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2040 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
50. Id. at 2041 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied by the dissent). Justice 
Powell's concurring opinion also was sympathetic to this reading: 
It also is clear that the language [of§ 501(c)(3)] itself does not mandate refusal of tax-
exempt status to any private school that maintains a racially discriminatory admissions 
policy. Accordingly, there is force in Justice Rehnquist's argument .... Indeed, were 
we writing prior to the history detailed in the Court's opinion, this could well be the 
construction that I would adopt. 
Id. at 2036 (Powell, J., concurring). 
51. Id. at 2036 (Powell, J., concurring). 
52. As the majority noted, "During the past 12 years there have been no fewer than 13 
bills introduced to overturn the IRS interpretation of§ 501(c)(3). Not one of these bills has 
emerged from any committee, although Congress had enacted numerous other amendments 
to § 501 during the same period ..•. " Id. at 2033. Justice Rehnquist, however, thought 
this evidence irrelevant: "[W]e have said before, and it is equally applicable here, that this 
type of congressional inaction is of virtually no weight in determining legislative intent. . . . 
These bills and related hearings indicate little more than that a vigorous debate has existed 
in Congress concerning the new IRS position." Id. at 2043 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (cita-
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tions to racially discriminatory private clubs.158 Consequently, 
although he read the disjunctive "or" in the statute to indicate 
that Congress did not intend a common law "charitable" gloss to 
apply to each category, he concurred with the majority's result be-
cause "there has been a decade of acceptance [by Congress] that is 
persuasive in the circumstances of this case. "154 
The majority did not address directly the University's argu-
ment that Green was a bad decision.1515 Although the Court reached 
its decision on the "public benefit" theory, it did suggest that the 
Green "public policy" doctrine was good law.158 
tions omitted). As it relates to the relevance of proposed legislation, this position does not 
seem unreasonable. Still, these affirmative acts by Congress indicate that it both recognized 
and supported the racial nondiscrimination requirement. See infra note 53. 
53. See 26 U.S.C. -§ 501(c) (1976). Congress amended the Code in response to the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia's decision in McGlotten v. Connally, which held, in 
part, that nonprofit private clubs that excluded nonwhites from membership were entitled 
to tax-exempt status. 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-59 (D.D.C. 1972). This legislation indicates that 
Congress supports nondiscrimination as a social policy, as the Senate Committee Report on 
the amendment illustrates: "[l]t is believed that it is inappropriate for a social club ..• to 
be exempt from taxation if its written policy is to discriminate on account of race, color or 
religion." S. REP. No. 1318, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. 
NEWS 6051, 6058. Further, as the majority in Bob Jones University noted, Coogreas had 
demonstrated its approval of racial nondiscrimination for tax-exempt private schools: "Con· 
gress' awareness of the denial of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory schools when 
enacting other and related legislation make out an unusually strong case of legislative acqui· 
escence in and ratification by implication of the 1970 and 1971 rulings [including Rev. Rul. 
41-477]." 103 S. Ct. at 2033. For a general discussion of Congress' recognition of the nondis-
crimination requirement, see Devins, supra note 23, at 161-63. See also Haig v. Agee, 453 
U.S. 280, 300 (1981) (Congress' failure to change an agency ruling is an implicit acceptance 
of that ruling). 
54. 103 S. Ct. at 2036 (Powell, J., concurring). 
55. The University had contended that Green repreSented "an elaborate, but insup-
portable, effort to write a provision into the Internal Revenue Code which the Congress did 
not write and did not imply." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 17-18. Although Green 
discussed the public benefit theory, that decision's primary basis was the doctrine that the 
tax exemption provision must be construed to avoid frustrations of public policy. See Green 
v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1161 (D.D.C. 1971); Note, The Revocation of Tax Exemp· 
tions and Tax Deductions for Donations to 501(c)(3) Organizations on Statutory and Con· 
stitutional Grounds, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 156, 160, 164 (1982). 
56. "A corollary to the public benefit principle is the requirement, long recognized in 
the law of the trusts, that the purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate 
established public policy." 103 S. Ct. at 2028. 
The Green court's "public policy" rule relied on cases concerned with the deduction of 
"ordinary and necessary" business expenses under § 162 of the Code, particularly on Tank 
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). In Tank Truck the Court disal-
lowed the deduction of fines paid by truck owners who had violated the state's maximum 
weight laws. The Court declared that it would deny deductions that would "frustrate 
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced 
by some governmental declaration thereof." 356 U.S. at 33-34. Tank Truck, however, may 
be of limited value in the tax exemption context. Its holding applies only to situations "in 
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1. Analysis of the Public Benefit Doctrine 
The legislative histories of tax laws throughout this century 
support the majority's holding that tax exempt organizations must 
provide some public benefit. In the floor debate over the Tariff Act 
of 1894,117 which provided tax exemptions for organizations "organ-
ized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational 
purposes,"118 Congress made clear that these tax benefits were 
available because the organizations served desirable public pur-
poses.119 The legislative histories of subsequent taxing acts have re-
affirmed this rationale, 60 as the following excerpt from a 1938 Con-
gressional report illustrates. 
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and 
other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated 
for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would other-
which an allowance of the deductions would amount to 'a device to avoid the consequence of 
violations of a law.' " Simon, supra note 41, at 497 (quoting Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 
U.S. 28, 29 (1958)). See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 19. 
In contrast, although tax-exempt status may be important to an organization's very 
existence, "to the extent that the organization's alleged public policy violation violates a 
federal or state statute, the granting of the exemption does not mitigate the consequence of 
the violation." Note, supra note 55, at 168. See also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 
19. But see Simon, supra note 41, at 497-500 (suggesting that the "public policy" doctrine 
applies to tax-exempt private schools, despite the Tank Truck limitation). Moreover, what 
would happen if an organization partially deviated from public policy? "(l]f the Green [pub-
lic policy] rationale is accepted, that if any organization, otherwise exempt under 
§ 501(c)(3), were to discriminate on account of age, maintain unsafe or unhealthful working 
conditions, create any financial barrier to education based on sex, or create any environmen-
tal disharmony, that organization's tax exemption would have to be denied.'' Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 36, at 20 (footnote omitted). See also Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note 
31, at 272-73. Cf. Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1229 (1979) 
(statement of Charles A. Bane, Co-Chairman, Lawyer's Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law) 
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]; id. at 470 (statement of Bill Lann Lee, Assistant Counsel, 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund). 
The Green court incorrectly relied on the business deduction cases to support the prop-
osition that tax-exempt organizations must conform with public policy before individuals 
can take a deduction for their contributions to these organizations. These cases are relevant 
only to the issue of defining "ordinary and necessary" expenses for purposes of determining 
taxable income. It is pure conjecture to suggest that judicial rulings on what is a permissible 
deduction for purposes of determining taxable income carry over to the charitable deduction 
issue. Even more egregious than this reasoning by conjecture, the income tax deduction 
cases do not support the Green public policy formulation. For a general discussion of the 
Green ruling, see also McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness on the Issue of Tax 
Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. __ (1984) 
(forthcoming). 
57. Cb. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894). 
58. Id. at 556. 
59. 26 CoNG. REc. 585-86 (1894). 
60. See, e.g., 50 CoNG. REc. 1305 (1913); 44 CoNG. REc. 4147, 4150 (1909). 
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wise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits 
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.61 
The same rationale-the service of desirable public pur-
poses-underlies the allowance of deductions for contributions to 
charitable organizations. When Congress in 1917 enacted a com-
panion provision to section 501(c)(3) providing for these deduc-
tions (under what is now section 170(c)(2)), the debate emphasized 
the requirement of a public benefit: "For every dollar that a man 
contributes for these public charities, educational, scientific, or 
otherwise, the public gets 100 per cent."62 In a similar vein, the 
legislative history included the following: 
[The charitable deduction] would remove the absurdity of exacting a tax even 
on that share of a man's income which he devotes not at all to himself, but to 
the pressing needs of educational and charitable institutions which operate 
without private profit. The exaction of such a tax is, at this time, worse than 
an absurdity .... It passes beyond individuals and strikes at America's 
whole organization for social progress and education, the relief of distress, 
and the remedy of evils.63 
Relying on these legislative histories, the majority correctly con-
cluded that the IRS acted properly under its rulemaking authority 
when it determined in 1971 to deny tax-exempt status unless an 
organization both fell within one of the categories described in sec-
tion 501(c)(3) and did not engage in activities contrary to settled 
public policy. 64 
2. Analysis of the Common Community Conscience 
Requirement 
Although a tax exemption standard properly may require that 
an organization have a public purpose or confer a public benefit, 
the majority's requirement of conformity to the common commu-
nity conscience goes too far. Even more significantly, this require-
ment could stifle the development of new ideas.615 A common com-
61. HousE CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, THE REVENUE BILL OF 1938, H.R. REP. No. 
1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938). For an excellent early analysis, see Reiling, Federal 
Taxation: What is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A. J. 525 (1958) (in accord with Bob 
Jones University). · 
62. 55 CoNG. REc. 6714, 6728 (1917) (statement of Senator Hollis). 
63. !d. at 6729 (reprinting "Do Not Penalize Generosity," Boston Transcript, June 29, 
1917) (emphasis supplied). 
64. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. 
65. A good example is private schools. Private schools are often a desirable educa-
tional alternative precisely because they are free of many of the governmental constraints on 
public schools. Private schools can impart values, teach religion, enforce different discipli-
nary standards, select and dismiss teachers, and insist on sustained academic achievement 
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munity conscience may reflect an ever-changing set of values that 
all exempt organizations continually and painstakingly would have 
to satisfy. As Justice Powell argued in his concurrence, the Bob 
Jones majority "ignores the important role played by tax exemp-
tions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, ac-
tivities and viewpoints."66 Similarly, Justice Brennan observed in a 
case upholding the constitutionality of property tax exemptions for 
religious organizations that "private, nonprofit groups . . . receive 
tax exemptions ... [because] each group contributes to the diver-
sity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigor-
ous, pluralistic society."67 In short, the majority in Bob Jones Uni-
versity ignored the public benefits of a heterogeneous society. 
The Court could have achieved its desired result by using the 
public benefit test alone, without the common community con-
science element. An organization's racially discriminatory practices 
may be so odious and contrary to the fundamental value of equal 
treatment under the law that the organization could never assert 
convincingly that it serves any public purpose. Regrettably, how-
ever, the vagueness of both the common community conscience 
and the public benefit standards creates the danger that the IRS 
may overzealously enforce the standards, resulting in unwanted so-
cial homogeneity. 
in ways that public schools cannot. This freedom is the essence of their appeal. See Finn & 
Devins, Reagan, Discrimination, and Private Schools, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1982, at 30, col. 3; 
Finn, Public Support for Private Education, pt. 1, AM. Eouc. (May 1982). Tax exemptions 
are essential to ensuring this diversity and autonomy. Private schools derive 23% of their 
revenues from their tax-exempt status or the related charitable deduction. See Hearings, 
supra note 56, at 400 (testimony of John Esty, Jr., President, National Association of Inde-
pendent Schools). 
Mr. Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring opinion that over 106,000 
organizations filed § 501(c)(3) returns in 1981. He found "it impossible to believe that all or 
even most of those organizations could prove that they 'demonstrably serve and [are] in 
harmony with the public interest' or that they are 'beneficial and stabilizing influences in 
community life.'" 103 S. Ct. at 2038. 
66. 103 S. Ct. at 2038. 
67. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). More-
over, the majority in Walz noted that "the use of a social welfare yardstick as a significant 
element to qualify for tax exemption could conceivably give rise to confrontations that could 
escalate to constitutional dimensions.'' I d. at 674. For a general discussion of constitutional 
limitations on government in the promotion of behavior or ideology, see Kamenshine, The 
First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1104 (1979). 
If the function of tax exemptions in encouraging diversity and conflicting views cele-
brated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Walz now gives way to one of ensuring harmony with the 
public interest and community conscience, then only a narrower range of organizations 
likely will qualify for tax exemptions. 
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3. Analysis of the Tax Exemption and the "Tax Expenditure" 
Budget 
The Bob Jones University decision revived the unsettled de-
bate over whether tax exemptions are really a form of government 
aid. 68Because the sixteenth amendment authorizes the taxation of 
all income "from whatever source derived,"69 Congress could have 
constructed a comprehensive tax base,70 requiring organizations 
that presently are exempt to conform to the same rules as taxable 
entities. Instead, Congress from the outset has chosen not to tax all 
possible entities but rather to tax selectively, often in pursuit of 
various social objectives. 
Not surprisingly, commentators have disagreed on the use of 
exemptions, deductions, and credits to accomplish social goals. Ac-
cording to Professor Stanley Surrey,71 numerous tax incentive pro-
visions have evolved in the Internal Revenue Code to assist partic-
ular industries, business activities, and financial transactions, or to 
encourage certain social activities, such as contributions to charity. 
He contends that a tax incentive is a cost to the government of the 
tax revenue that it would have collected if the law did not provide 
for that particular deduction, exemption, or credit.72 Therefore, a 
tax incentive is an indirect expenditure of government funds to 
support the particular purpose behind the incentive.73 Professor 
68. See infra notes 96-llO and accompanying text. 
69. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVI. A comprehensive tax base would conform to the classical 
definition of income as the increase in net market value of assets between the beginning and 
end of. the taxable period, plus the market value of consumption (personal and living out-
lays) during the period, including gifts. For corporations with no consumption expenditures, 
the measure would be the net accretion in asset values between the beginning and end of 
the taxable period, without regard to distributions to shareholders. 
70. HAIG, THE CONCEPT OF INCOME-ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS IN THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX (1921); H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 61-62 (1938). 
71. See Surrey, Our Troubled Tax Policy: False Routes and Proper Paths to Change, 
12 TAX NoTEs 179 (1981); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Govern-
ment Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705 
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Surrey, Tax Incentives]. 
72. For the fiscal year 1983, the Office of Management and Budget estimates that the 
deduction for charitable contributions to education results in a revenue loss to the Treasury 
of $925 million and that the "outlay equivalent," which would be the amount required to be 
spent by government to accomplish the same objective, would be $940 million. OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G 29, 35 (1983). 
73. The following equation illustrates Surrey's position: if X represents what Congress 
could tax as income, and if Y represents what in fact Congress taxes after allowing for exclu-
sions, exemptions, deductions and credits, then X-Y is the aggregate cost of these special 
provisions, or the indirect expenditure by the Government attributable to these provisions. 
The tax expenditure budget breaks out this aggregate cost into the cost of each exclusion, 
exemption, deduction, or credit. 
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Surrey argues that the government could administer these incen-
tives or subsidies more efficiently through direct governmental as-
sistance in the form of grants, loans, interest subsidies, loan guar-
antees, and the like.7' Moreover, direct governmental assistance 
would relieve the present inequity of forcing taxpayers who do not 
benefit from these tax incentives to bear a greater share of the tax 
burden.715 
On the other hand, Professor Boris Bittker argues that exemp-
tions, and credits are not necessarily costs to the government. In-
stead, they reflect a legislative choice to omit certain transactions, 
entities, or activities from the tax base. 76 
There is no way to tax everything; a legislative body, no matter how avid for 
revenue, can do no more than pick out from the universe of people, entities, 
and events over which it has jurisdiction those that, in its view, are appropri-
ate objects of taxation. In specifying the ambit of any tax, the legislature 
cannot avoid "exempting" those persons, events, activities, or entities that 
are outside the territory of the proposed tax. In describing a tax's boundaries, 
the draftsman may choose to make the exclusions explicit ("all property ex-
cept that owned by nonprofit organizations"), or implicit ("all property 
owned by organizations operated for profit"), but either way, the result is the 
Tax expenditures increased from 24.8% of federal revenues in 1971 to 40.8% in 1982. 
See CoNGRESSIONAL BUDGET OrncB, TAX ExPENDITURES: BUDGET CoNTRoL OPTioNs AND 
FIVE-YEAR BUDGET PRoJECTIONS FOR FiscAL YEARS 1983-1987 12-13 (1982). In the 1984 
budget the estimated total is $388.4 billion. See PECHMAN, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIBS, 
THE 1984 BUDGET 178 (Brookings Institution 1983). Whatever one's position on tax expendi-
tures, the enormity of the amount must be a factor in any discussion of tax policy. For a 
discussion of the "tax exemption as aid" issue, see infra notes 96-110 and accompanying 
text. 
74. [T]he deduction for charitable contributions is sometimes cited as a method 
of government assistance that promotes private decisionmaking-the taxpayer, and 
not the Government, selects the charity and determines how much to give. But a 
direct expenditure program under which the Government matched with its grants, 
on a no-question-asked and no-second-thoughts basis, the gifts of private individuals 
to the charities they selected, would equally preserve private decisionmaking. 
Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 71, at 719. 
75. See id. at 713-38. 
In other words, Professor Surrey maintains that if the government taxed all income at a 
given percentage, a taxpayer would retain his income less the tax. But if the government 
selectively taxes only a part of a taxpayer's income, then it affords him preferential treat-
ment over other taxpayers who have income not so preferred. This result violates what econ-
omists call vertical and horizontal equity: all those with different levels of real economic 
income should pay proportionately different taxes (vertical equity); all those with the same 
levels of income should pay the same tax (horizontal equity). The Tax Expenditure Budget 
proves that our present tax system has neither. 
76. Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political Rhetoric, 71 MicH. L. Rsv. 1099, 
1102-28 (1973); see also Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Sur-
rey & Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538, 539 (1969); Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as 
a Goal of Income Tux Reform, 80 HARv. L. REv. 925, 934-58 (1967). 
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same-taxpayers are separated from non-taxpayers.77 
Irving Kristol has criticized the tax expenditure concept of exemp-
tions for similar reasons: 
You are implicitly asserting that all income covered by the general provisions 
of the tax laws belongs of right to the government, and that what the govern-
ment decides, by exemptions or qualification, not to collect in taxes consti-
tutes a subsidy. Whereas a subsidy used to mean a governmental expenditure 
for a certain purpose, it now acquires quite another meaning-i.e., a generous 
decision by government not to take your money. 78 
Although the Bob Jones University Court did not explicitly adopt 
Surrey's view that a tax exemption is government aid, its narrow 
"common community conscience" standard could portend a tax 
policy that would grant exemptions only to those organizations 
that pander to community or majority sentiment. This system for 
awarding tax exemptions would be much like the present system 
for awarding federal grants, in that both would condition govern-
mental benefits on community assent. This system, however, could 
stray far from past policies that have encouraged the diverse and 
conflicting views of a pluralistic society because it would inhibit 
thousands of presently exempt entities from venturing into ideo-
logically rough waters. 
In sum, the majority opinion on tax exemptions-even though 
the Court seems to favor Surrey's viewpoint-falls into a penum-
bra between the Surrey and Bittker positions. If the Court had 
pursued its inclination and held that the tax exemption was gov-
ernment aid, then the IRS could develop a series of regulations, 
similar to the system of rules associated with a government subsidy 
program, to assure consistency and parity in the benefits granted. 
By refusing to hold that a tax exemption is aid-a holding that 
would have forced tax-exempt institutions to comply with a host of 
government regulations associated with governmental subsidy pro-
grams79-while at the same time recognizing broad IRS authority 
to develop rules governing tax-exempt status-an approach that 
might result in the granting of tax exemptions on a toothless pro 
forma basis80-the Bob Jones University Court established a 
77. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1288 (1969). 
78. Kristol, Taxes, Property and Equality, 37 PUB. INT. 3, 14-15 (1974). The propo-
nents of the Tax Expenditure Budget would contend that income may be defined as annual 
accretions (or decretions) in wealth, plus consumption. To whatever extent this base is re-
duced by a deduction, exclusion, or credit, this amount becomes an indirect expenditure. 
See supra note 71. See also Galvin, It's VAT Time Again, 21 TAX NoTEs 275 (1983). 
79. See infra text accompanying notes 96-110. 
80. For example, current IRS enforcement procedures may not effectuate the goals 
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rulemaking model that is inconsistent with its interpretation of the 
tax exemption provision. In short, the majority failed to ensure the 
enforcement of its view that tax-exempt institutions must reflect 
community values because it failed to hold that tax exemptions are 
government aid or that the ms must enforce the public policy re-
quirement strictly. 
B. The Scope of IRS Rulemaking Authority 
The Bob Jones University Court recognized broad IRS au-
thority to determine what activities are "at odds with the common 
community conscience."81 The majority noted that "ever since the 
inception of the tax code, Congress has seen fit to vest in those 
administering the tax laws very broad authority to interpret those 
laws."82 The Court thus rejected petitioners' argument that ms 
rulemaking on tax exemptions is "a plain usurpation of Congres-
sional law-making powers by the non-elected public servants of the 
Internal Revenue Service."83 
An analysis of the proper scope of the Service's rulemaking 
authority must begin with the principle that Congress enacts the 
tax laws and the ms has the responsibility of interpreting and en-
forcing them. The ffiS cannot legislate. 84 The issue, then, is to de-
termine the permissible boundaries of IRS rulemaking. In Man-
hattan General Equipment Co. v. CommissionerBIS the Court 
described this power: 
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal 
statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power to 
make law-for no such power can be delegated by Congress-but the power 
to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by 
underlying the Bob Jones University decision because some schools that have been adjudi-
cated as racially discriminatory under the 1964 Civil Rights Act have received tax exemp-
tions anyway. See Devins, The Bob Jones Case-Over to Congress, Christian Sci. Monitor, 
June 29, 1983, at 23, col. 1. 
81. 103 S. Ct. at 2029. 
82. Id. at 2031. 
83. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 36, at 22. 
84. Congress has charged the Internal Revenue Service with the administration of the 
tax laws. Because the language of this legislation is general, the Service issues regulations 
and rulings to implement and explain its position on the law. Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the Treasury gives notice of proposed rulemaking and publishes proposed 
regulations in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982); Schmid, The Tax Regulations 
Making Process-Then and Now, 24 TAX LAw. 541, 541-42 (1971). Mter a period of receiv-
ing written comments, the Treasury then promulgates the final regulations. The Service 
issues revenue rulings, which usually deal with particular transactions or problems. See gen-
erally Note, Federal Tax Rulings: Procedure and Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 78 (1967). 
85. 297 u.s. 129 (1936). 
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the statute. . . . The statute defines the rights of the taxpayer and fixes a 
standard by which such rights are to be measured.86 
In Bob Jones University the Court granted the Service almost 
plenary rulemaking authority: 
In the first instance . . . the responsibility for construing the Code falls to 
the IRS. Since Congress cannot be expected to anticipate every conceivable 
problem that can arise or to carry out day-to-day oversight, it relies on the 
administrators and on the courts to implement the legislative will. Adminis-
trators, like judges, are under oath to do so. 61 
The majority's interpretation, however, poses several problems. 
First, the danger exists that the Service may selectively enforce its 
regulations.88 Justice Blackmun commented on this threat as 
follows: 
[W]here the philanthropic organization is concerned, there appears to be lit-
tle to circumscribe the almost unfettered power of the Commissioner. This 
may be very well so long as one subscribes to the particular brand of social 
policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating at the time . . . , but ap-
plication of our tax laws should not operate in so fickle a fashion. 811 
86. Id. at 134-35. See also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) 
("There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting 
rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted."). 
87. 103 S. Ct. at 2031. Curiously, in the first of the tax exemption cases, Green v. 
Kennedy, the district court suggested that the IRS was blameless for not having changed 
the policy of granting tax exemptions to discriminatory private schools. The court believed 
that "[w]bat stops [the Commissioner of Internal Revenue] from extending disallowance to 
the schools . . . is not unawareness of the significance of deductions, but rather certain legal 
conclusions, including conclusions as to the scope of his authority under the Code." 309 F. 
Supp. 1127, 1135 (D.D.C. 1970). See supra notes 20, 55-56. The court apparently felt that 
the Commissioner should act only on an explicit congressional directive or a binding court 
determination. In other words, the court envisioned a scheme in which the judiciary-not 
the Service-would have primary authority in interpreting the meaning of the congressio-
nally enacted Internal Revenue Code. Ironically, in Bob Jones University the Supreme 
Court recognized the IRS's authority to promulgate regulations established through judicial 
initiatives directed at the IRS. For a general discussion of the judiciary's usurpation of legis-
lative authority on the tax-exempt school issue, see McCoy & Devins, supra note 56. 
88. See Note, supra note 55, at 172-74. 
89. Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1974) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). The D.C. Circuit echoed Justice Blackmun's concerns in Big Mama Rag, Inc. 
v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1980): "The standards [used by the IRS to 
grant or deny tax exemptions] may not be so imprecise that they afford latitude to individ-
ual IRS officials to pass judgment on the content and quality of an applicant's views and 
goals •... " Under this standard, the court held that the definition of "educational" con-
tained in the IRS regulations under § 501(c)(3) was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1037. 
See also Center on Corp: Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973) 
(politically motivated denial of educational exemption by IRS is null and void); Comment, 
Tax Exemptions for Educational Institutions: Discretion and Discrimination, 128 U. PA. 
L. REv. 849 (1980). But cf. National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(neither § 501(c)(3) nor the first amendment compels granting educational exemption to 
organization whose publications could not be found "educational" under any reasonable in-
HeinOnline -- 36 Vand. L. Rev. 1373 1983
1983] TAX POLICY ANALYSIS 1373 
Nonetheless, the Bob Jones University majority believed that the 
Service could be trusted not to breach this authority.90 The Court 
sought to minimize the danger of selective enforcement by 
stressing that "these sensitive determinations should be made only 
where there is no doubt that the organization's activities violate 
fundamental public policy."91 
Second, the IRS may go either too far or not far enough in 
regulating the wide array of tax-exempt organizations. The Service 
now may examine the tax-exempt status of many organizations 
against the stricter Bob Jones standard of "harmony with the pub-
lic interest" and "common community conscience." This prospect 
is disquieting because the standard, although strict, is open-ended 
and beclouded. For example, the fate of an organization that does 
not violate fundamental public policy but may not be clearly in 
full compliance with the Bob Jones University standard is unclear. 
Justice Blackmun's observation that too much administrative dis-
cretion may permit the IRS to administer tax laws in "so fickle a 
fashion" continues to be a concern because the Internal Revenue 
Code is so pervasive in its application and the opportunity for 
abuse is so great. In the tax exemption area the stakes are too high 
to tolerate a system that sometimes functions haphazardly or 
desultorily. 
Third, because of the pecuniary value of tax-exempt status, an 
organization's survival may depend on the views of the particular 
administration in office. For example, President Carter had sought 
to impose racial quotas on tax-exempt private schools to further 
terpretation of that term). 
90. Contrary to this view, Justice Powell emphll}lized the following: 
(T]he balancing of these substantial interests [of racial nondiscrimination in education 
and of permitting unorthodox private behavior] is for Congress to perform. I am un-
willing to join any suggestion that the Internal Revenue Service is invested with au-
thority to decide which public policies are sufficiently "fundamental" to require denial 
of tax exemptions. Its business is to administer laws designed to produce revenue for 
the Government, not to promote "public policy." 
103 S. Ct. at 2039 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). The majority responded by 
contending that "The Court's opinion does not warrant that interpretation ... [because] 
the policy against racial discrimination in education ... is sufficiently clear to warrant Jus-
tice Powell's .•• support [for] our finding of longstanding Congressional acquies-
cence ..•• " Id. at 2032 n.23. This contention, however, lacks any merit. Justice Powell's 
concurrence addressed the narrow issue of whether§ 501(c)(3) prohibited racial discrimina-
tion in education. The majority, on the other hand, made broad pronouncements as to both 
the meaning of § 501(c)(3) and the authority of the IRS to determine that meaning. See 
supra text accompanying notes 41-43. 
91. 103 S. Ct. 11t 2032. 
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the nondiscrimination requirement.92 In contrast, President Rea-
gan has attempted to lift nonstatutory regulations governing tax-
exempt private schools. 93 Although neither president succeeded, 94 
the threat remains that similar acts by the Executive branch could 
bankrupt organizations whose existences depend on tax 
exemptions. 915 
C. Issues That the Court Did Not Resolve 
1. Is a Tax Exemption Government Aid?96 
Although the Court recognized that tax-exempt status was a 
governmentally conferred benefit,97 it did not say that tax-exempt 
status is public aid. Whether a tax exemption falls within this clas-
sification raises issues under both the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which forbids granting federal aid to institutions that discriminate 
on the basis of "race, color or national origin,"98 and under the 
92. 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978). See Wilson, An Overview of 
the IRS's Revised Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Schools as Tax-Exempt Organi-
zations, 57 TAXES 515 (1979). 
93. IRS News Release (Jan. 8, 1982). 
94. Congress responded to the Carter proposal by passing riders to the Treasury Ap-
propriations Act of 1980 that prohibited the IRS from spending money to implement it. See 
supra note 53. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enjoined the Reagan ad-
ministration from granting tax-exempt status to any school that discriminates on the basis 
of race. Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982), order continued in force, 
No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983). 
95. Another troubling possibility of allowing the IRS this broad power is that the IRS 
might be too deferential and grant tax exemptions to organizations that clearly violate fun-
damental public policy. This threat is particularly significant because civil rights proponents 
might not be able to utilize the courts to ensure that IRS procedures are sufficient. Civil 
rights advocates currently are seeking judicial adoption of stringent enforcement standards 
through the Wright v. Regan case that is now before the Supreme Court. See supra note 94. 
Wright, however, ultimately may prove that civil rights groups lack a sufficiently particular-
ized and identifiable harm to bring a lawsuit. See McCoy & Devins, supra note 56. The 
Court's recognition of broad IRS rulemaking authority in Bob Jones University actually 
suggests that the courts will limit their substantive intervention in this area. See Devins, A 
Political Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States, _ J. OF L. & PoL. _ ( ) 
(forthcoming). Congress likewise cannot be trusted for satisfactory guidance, as demon-
strated both by its failure to make any sort of response to President Reagan's policy shift 
and by its inability to pass any affirmative legislation on this matter. 
96. Portions of this section are adopted from Devins, supra note 23, at 163-65. 
97. See 103 S. Ct. at 2026-28. "When the Government grants exemptions or allows 
deductions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for the 
donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious 'donors.'" !d. at 
2028. "It would be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant 
the benefit of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational entities .•• . "!d. at 
2030. 
98. 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000-2001 (1964). 
.. 
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establishment clause of the first amendment, which forbids govern-
ment establishment of religion and limits federal aid to religiously 
affiliated private schools. 99 
The Civil Rights Act's total prohibition of governmental assis-
tance to discriminatory institutions suggests that its coverage 
should extend to the granting of tax exemptions to private 
schools.100 The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia reached this conclusion in McGlotten v. Connally/01 in 
which it decided that a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory 
fraternal order is federal aid for purposes of the Civil Rights Act.102 
Part of the basis of this holding was the court's recognition that 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act recognized various 
forms of indirect assistance as federal aid, such as the sale of gov-
ernment property at a reduced price.103 Furthermore, the court 
found that the purpose of the Act "is clearly to eliminate discrimi-
nation in programs or activities benefitting from federal financial 
assistance.mo• The McGlotten decision may contribute to what has 
been described as a "constitutionalizing" of the Internal Revenue 
Code because it subsumes the revenue collecting function of the 
Code under broader social policies derived from the Constitu-
tion.1015 Professors Bittker and Kaufman see an even broader im-
pact of the court's reasoning: 
[T)he "tax-subsidy" rationale of the McGlotten case has implications be-
yond the area of racial restrictions .... McGlotten's logic apparently prohib-
its the granting of tax allowances to a fraternal order that imposes such re-
strictions (based on its customers' religion, national or ethnic origin, political 
allegiance, sex, and perhaps other characteristics) ..•. Finally, nothing in 
McGlotten limits its reach to income, estate and gift taxes; "subsidies" in the 
form of exemptions, deductions, special rates, and similar allowances may be 
found in other federal taxes, as well as in state and local taxes.108 
The establishment clause requires a different analysis of tax 
exemptions. In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York/01 the Su-
preme Court held that a tax exemption is not governmental aid 
99. U.S. CoNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion •••• ").See generally L. TRmE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw§§ 14-8, -9 (1978). 
100. Cf. Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). 
101. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). 
102. Id. at 461. 
103. See id. at 461 & n.7. 
104. Id. 
105. See Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972). 
106. Id. at 62; see supra note 56. 
107. 397 u.s. 664 (1970). 
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under the establishment clause. The majority opinion explained 
that "[t]he grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the 
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but 
simply abstains from demanding that the church support the 
state.mos Although the majority's recognition in Walz that a reli-
gious institution benefits through a tax exemption seems inconsis-
tent with its principal holding, 109 establishment clause analysis fo-
cuses upon whether the "primary effect" of the exemption is to aid 
the institution, not upon whether some benefit might accrue to the 
institution.110 Thus, a tax exemption might be permissible under 
the establishment clause but impermissible under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. 
2. Can Some of a Tax-Exempt Organization's Practices Violate 
Public Policy? 
The Court in Bob Jones University avoided the question of 
whether an organization providing a public benefit and satisfying 
the other requirements of section 501(c)(3) could nevertheless be 
denied tax-exempt status if certain of its activities violated a law 
or public policy by holding that racially discriminatory private 
schools confer no public benefit.111 By limiting its holding to racial 
discrimination in education, the Court neither encouraged nor dis-
couraged the Service from adopting regulations to ensure compli-
ance with other fundamental public policies. Of course, a require-
ment that an organization desiring tax-exempt status must comply 
with all laws and all public policies could make the attainment of 
tax-exempt status incredibly difficult. The amicus curiae Indepen-
dent Sector112 speculated on the burden of forcing tax-exempt or-
108. Id. at 675. 
109. Id. at 674-75. 
110. Supreme Court precedents before 1977 had suggested that almost no form of aid 
from the state, either to nonpublic schools or to families of nonpublic school students, would 
be constitutionally permissible. The Court, however, has relaxed this restriction in recent 
years. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1973) (tuition 
grants and deductions and maintenance reimbursements declared unconstitutional), and 
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (broad range of direct and indirect aid declared 
unconstitutional), with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (funding upheld for thera-
peutic and diagnostic tests but prohibited for field trips and instructional materials), and 
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658-61 (1980) (direct reimbursement to 
private schools for state mandated testing upheld). 
111. 103 S. Ct. at 2031 n.21. 
112. Independent Sector is a coalition of over 400 national voluntary organizations. Its 
brief, which argued in favor of statutory affirmance of the Fourth Circuit decision in Bob 
Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc., focused on the need for the Court 
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ganizations to comply with all fundamental public policies: 
And what about the exempt organizations themselves? Would they be-
come subject to myriad regulations and legal obligations . . . ? If so, retire-
ment homes operated by particular religious charities might be forced to ad-
mit persons of any creed; private schools or organizations for girls or boys 
might have to become coeducational; senior citizens groups might be forbid-
den to discriminate on the basis of age; community centers designed to serve 
particular ethnic groups might have to open their doors to all comers; and 
any exempt organization might be required to modify its physical facilities to 
provide access to the handicapped. Resolving these and similar questions that 
might be raised by an overbroad holding in this case could occupy exempt 
organizations, their benefactors, the courts, and Congress for years to come.113 
The Court's stated limitation of its holding to the racial discrimi-
nation issue is no satisfactory answer to these concerns. 
3. Does Granting of Tax-Exempt Status Trigger Constitutional 
Scrutiny? ~ 
Several amici in Bob Jones University urged the Supreme 
Court to hold that granting tax-exempt status to racially discrimi-
natory private schools would violate the fifth amendment's equal 
protection comJ}onent. 114 These amici argued that the govern-
ment's grant of a tax exemption is "state action" subject to consti-
tutional restraints that prohibit government from providing 
tangible financial aid to racially discriminatory private schools.115 
The Court did not address this issue because it was able to decide 
the case on statutory grounds.116 
Although the decisions on whether tax exemptions constitute 
state action are inconsistent, at least some trends emerge. Courts 
tend to find state action more often when racial discrimination is 
at issuem and when the action sought to be stopped is the govern-
to limit its holding to the issue of racial discrimination in education. See infra note 113 and 
accompanying text. 
113. Brief for Independent Sector at 20, Bob Jones Univ. 
114. See Brief of William T. Coleman, Jr. at 57-62; Brief for Lawyers' Committee for 
Civil Rights Under Law at 30; Brief for American Civil Liberties Union at 17-32; Brief for 
North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers at 5-7. 
115. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (Mississippi statute that 
would have provided textbook assistance to racially discriminatory private schools held un-
constitutional). In Norwood, the Court recognized that "discriminatory treatment exerts a 
pervasive influence on the entire educational process." Id. at 469. 
116. 103 S. Ct. at 2032 n.24. 
117. Courts generally apply a less stringent test for state action in race discrimination 
cases. See, e.g., Spark v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 510 F.2d 1277, 1281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per 
curiam); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 1000 (1975); Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975). This principle extends to tax exemption cases. For exam-
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mental grant of tax-exempt status rather than private discrimina-
tory conduct.118 Existing doctrine thus suggests that the Constitu-
pie, in Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (three judge 
court), a federal district court in Wisconsin held that "the 'state action' doctrine was devel-
oped in response to efforts to eliminate private racial discrimination .... Accordingly[,] 
• . . there might be a less demanding standard of what constitutes sufficient state involve-
ment where there are allegations of racial discrimination." Id. at 667 (quoting Bright v. 
Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1392-94 (N.D. Ind. 1970)). Similarly, in Jackson v. Statler 
Found. the Second Circuit noted the following: 
Where racial discrimination is involved, the courts have found "state action" to exist; 
where other claims are at issue (due process, freedom of speech), the courts have gener-
ally concluded that no "state action" has occurred .... [Thus, there is] a less onerous 
test for cases involving racial discrimination, and a more rigorous standard for other 
claims. 
496 F.2d 623, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted); see also Note, The Judicial Role in 
Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARv. L. REv. 378, 
399 (1979). Cf. Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note 31, at 246-48 (arguing that religious 
schools might be judged under a different "state action" standard since an important pur-
pose of granting tax exemptions to such institutions is the avoidance of impermissible gov-
ernment entanglement with religion). 
118. One commentator articulated the rationale for this approach as follows: 
Because enjoining the private party necessarily will affect private interests, some 
weight must be accorded these interests during the course of judicial inquiry. In such a 
case, the court should inquire whether there is a sufficient nexus of governmental and 
private action to transform the private actor into an agent of the government. When 
the litigation is directed at the conduct of the government, however, the issue becomes 
whether the government's actions encourage or support violations of constitutional 
guarantees. Thus, the different implications of the remedies sought suggest that differ-
ent constitutional standards should he formulated for the two types of cases. 
Comment, The Tax-Exempt Status of Sectarian Educational Institutions that Discrimi-
nate on the Basis of Race, 65 IowA L. REv. 258, 265-66 (1979). See also Brown, State Action 
Analysis of Tax Expenditures, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 97, 116-22 (1976). Case law also 
supports this view. Compare Falkenstein v. Dep't of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Or. 
1972) (three judge court) (state tax exemptions for racially exclnsive fraternal organization 
held unconstitutional), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973), and 
Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. at 662 (state tax exemptions for racially dis-
criminatory organizations enjoined), with New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States 
Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975) (sex discrimination by exempt organization held 
not state action); Junior Chamber of Com. v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (lOth Cir.) 
(same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974); and Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 394 F. 
Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1975) (memorandum opinion) (sex discrimination by congressionally 
chartered organization held not state action), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976). 
Even if a court finds state action, it also must determine whether tax-exempt status is a 
significant governmental benefit and whether the granting of tax-exempt status to racially 
discriminatory institutions constitutes intentional discrimination. This Article has adopted 
the view that tax exemptions are government aid for purposes of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
See supra notes 96-110; see also Comment, Tax Incentives as State Action, 122 U. PA. L. 
REv. 414, 421-23, 453-55 (1973). But see Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 105, at 63-68; Note, 
supra note 55, at 180-84. The intentional discrimination requirement poses no problem in 
the context of tax exemptions to private schools with stated policies of racial discrimination, 
such as Bob Jones University (interracial dating) and Goldsboro Christian Schools (admis-
sions). IRS knowledge of such policies satisfies the intent requirement established in Wash-
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tion may prevent the government from granting tax-exempt status 
to racially discriminatory institutions.119 Fortunately, the Bob 
Jones University Court was able to avoid this issue by deciding on 
statutory grounds. Constitutional prohibitions are broader than 
1964 Civil Rights Act standards. Consequently, "[a] broad holding 
that tax exemptions are [state] action for constitutional purposes 
could leave exempt organizations vulnerable to legal challenges on 
a variety of theories having nothing to do with racial discrimina-
tion. That result would be contrary to the public interest in en-
couraging philanthropic activity .... "120 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Bob Jones University decision exemplifies the risks of 
leaving tax policy determinations to the courts. On one hand, the 
Court went too far in interposing into the Code its own standards 
of "common community conscience" and "public purpose."121 On 
the other hand, the Court appeared to abdicate its supervisory 
powers to the IRS.122 This Article recommends that in the formu-
lation of tax policy, courts should not supplant the role of Congress 
as lawmaker by making broad tax policy pronouncements, but 
should oversee the IRS to ensure that it properly implements and 
enforces the tax laws. 
Thus far Congress has relied on judicial and IRS initiatives to 
define the tax exemption requirements and the parameters of the 
IRS's rulemaking authority; it has interceded only when dissatis-
fied with the actions of the other branches.128 Congress, however, 
must take the lead in resolving the tax-exempti<?n issue, as Justice 
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (qualifying test for police officers with racially dispro-
portionate impact held constitutional). If the IRS was unaware of a school's racially 
discriminatory practices, however, under Washington that school would retain its tax-ex-
empt status. The solution here would be to impute to the IRS notice of all schools that fail 
to satisfy racial nondiscrimination enforcement standards. 
119. The Green decisions all but concluded that tax-exempt status constituted state 
action. In Green v. Kennedy the court issued the injunction, in part, because "of the sub-
stantiality of the grave constitutional questions presented by plaintiffs." 309 F. Supp. at 
1133. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. In Green v. Connally the court finalized 
that temporary injunction in the form of a permanent injunction. 330 F. Supp. at 1150. 
Although it based its holding on statutory grounds, the court noted: "We are fortified in our 
view of the correctness of the IRS construction by the consideration that a contrary inter-
pretation of the tax laws would raise serious constitutional questions, such as those we ven-
tilated in [Green v. Kennedy]." ld. at 1164. 
120. Brief for Independent Sector, supra note 113, at 27-28. 
121. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text. 
123. See generally McCoy & Devins, supra note 56. 
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Powell emphasized in his concurrence in Bob Jones University: 
There no longer is any justification for Congress to hesitate-as it apparently 
has-in articulating and codifying its desired policy. . . . Many questions re-
main, such as whether organizations that violate other policies should receive 
tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). These should be legislative policy 
choices. It is not appropriate to leave the IRS "on the cutting edge of devel-
oping national policy." ... The contours of public policy should be deter-
mined by Congress, not by j~dges or the IRS.124 
Congress, as a more capable legislator than the courts or the IRS, 
is better equipped to formulate a tax exemption policy. The com-
plexity of an indefinite and unidentified class of potential plaintiffs 
with perhaps varying levels of grievance, an open-ended class of 
defendant institutions neither entirely similar nor dissimilar to the 
particular institutions in litigation, and the economic costs and 
124. 103 S. Ct. at 2039 (Powell, J., concurring). According to Department of Justice 
attorneys who have worked on this matter, Congress' passivity has been costly: "[T]he con-
tinued litigation of the issue in open-ended injunction suits, coupled with Congress' decision 
to prohibit new policy shifts by the Treasury, has caused a paralysis among the three 
branches of government. This paralysis has prevented the establishment of further guide-
lines to meet changing conditions." Ferguson & Henzken, supra note 11, at 103. Congress 
should take the lead in resolving the tax exemption issue because Congress is a better legis-
lator than are the courts. In a Brookings Institution study of court efforts to develop and 
implement social policy, Donald Horowitz drew this conclusion: 
The distinctiveness of the judicial process-its expenditure of social resources on 
individual complaints, one at a time-is what unfits the courts for much of the impor-
tant work of government. Retooling the judicial process to cope with the new responsi-
bilities of the courts means enhancing their capacity to function more systematically in 
terms of general categories that transcend individual cases. Some such innovations are 
required. And yet, it would seem, there is a limit to the changes of this kind that courts 
can absorb and still remain courts. Heightened attention to recurrent patterns of be-
havior risks inattention to individual cases. Over the long run, augmenting judicial ca-
pacity may erode the distinctive contribution the courts make to the social order. The 
danger is that courts, in developing a capacity to improve on the work of other institu-
tions, may become altogether too much like them. 
D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SociAL PoLICY 298 (1977). Professor Alexander Bickel simi-
larly noted that the Court's institutional survival hinged on its ability to abide by the con-
straints of our system of divided powers. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE IDEA OP 
PROGRESS (1970). Considering recent congressional efforts to limit federal court jurisdiction, 
Professor Bickel's fears seem well founded. See generally Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Ju-
risdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17 (1981). 
Many jurists, however, feel that the courts do have a place in the shaping of social 
policy. As Justice Cardozo suggested, "[W]hen the social needs demand one settlement 
rather than another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacri-
fice custom in the pursuit of other and larger ends." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OP THE JuDI-
CIAL PROCESS 65 (1921). Similarly, Archibald Cox and James Hart Ely have suggested that 
the Supreme Court has been at its best when it has introduced universalistic normative 
principles in an effort to set the parameters of acceptable social behavior. A. Cox, THE RoLE 
OF THE SUPREME CoURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
(1980). 
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budgetary concerns affecting not only the parties but also others 
demand that Congress glean and sift the social facts, weigh the 
costs, and determine time periods for phasing in and phasing out 
particular practices.125 
Given that Congress should take the lead in clarifying the re-
quirements private schools must meet to attain tax-exempt status, 
the issue becomes how such legislation should be formulated. As a 
starting point, Congress should assess current enforcement proce-
dures, which require that a tax-exempt private school "show af-
firmatively both that it has adopted a racially nondiscriminatory 
policy as to students that is made known to the general public and 
that since the adoption of that policy it has operated in a bona fide 
manner in accordance therewith."128 A school can comply with 
these current requirements if it (1) adopts formally nondiscrimina-
tory policies in its charter or by-laws, (2) refers to these policies in 
its advertising brochures, and (3) publishes annual notice of these 
policies in a local newspaper of general circulation.127 These proce-
dures are insufficient; private schools adjudicated as discriminatory 
under the fourteenth amendment and thus ineligible to receive di-
rect government assistance often qualify for tax-exempt status.128 
The tax exemption rules ought to conform with the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, which prohibits government aid to private schools that 
have no minority students or staff and that were formed or sub-
stantially expanded at or about the time of area-wide public school 
desegregation.129 
Brown v. Board of Education130 is now almost thirty years old; 
its call for due deliberate speed in the elimination of segregation in 
the nation's school system still goes unheeded in many quarters. 
The current emphasis on the need for educational excellence in 
primary and secondary education is of no greater urgency than the 
need to achieve equality of educational opportunity for every child. 
Congress has the capability and the competency to act-and surely 
125. See D. HoROWITZ, supra note 124, at 255-74. 
126. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. 
127. !d. at 587-88. 
128. Under 1964 Civil Rights Act standards, the government cannot grant aid to a 
school if a judicial or administrative proceeding has determined that school to be discrinli-
natory, or if the school was established at a time when public schools in its area were deseg-
regating and the school cannot demonstrate that it was nondiscrinlinatory. See, e.g., Nor-
wood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). 
129. For a similar proposal, in the form of a Model Statute, see Devins, supra note 23, 
at 176-78. 
130. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
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must act-in formulating effective national tax policy that incorpo-
rates Brown's objectives. 
